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Bilateral Contracts
ABSTRACT
The basic form of economic exchange is a bilateral relationship between
buyer and seller. If economic conditions are common knowledge there is
no problem in principle to determine the efficient quantity to trade.
But if benefits are known only to the buyer and costs are known only to
the seller a situation of bargaining under incomplete information results.
Instead of relying on the vagaries of a bargaining outcome, which might
be quite costly to implement, economic inefficiency is likely to be im-
proved by a contractual arrangement that could be agreed upon in advance.
In such contracts various aspects of the exchange could be allocated to
the two parties involved. For example, a price per unit might be fixed
in advance and the buyer might be allowed to name his quantity in the
light of the information he has about benefits. A more complex version
would present the buyer with a non—linear price schedule. Alternatively
the. supplier might be given control.
While these solutions are fairly well understood, there are other
types of arrangements in which control is mutual. This paper studies
contracts of this nature. We examine the feasibility of implementing
various agreements and the nature of optimal bilateral contracts under
these informational circumstances. When the random influences impact
both parties significantly, full efficiency is not attainable. We show
that contractsinvolving mutual control might sometimes be superiorto
the best contract giving one side or the other exclusive dominance.
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(617) 495—4560
Seppo Honkapohja
Yrjo Jahnsson Foundation
Ludviginkatu 3-5A
SF—00l30 Helsinki 13
FINLANDIntroduction
The basic form of economic exchange is a bilateral relationship be—
tween buyer and seller. If economic conditions are common knowledge, there
is no problem in principle to find the efficient quantity to trade. But
if benefits are known only to the buyer and costs are known only to the
seller a bargaining situation results. In such circumstances economic
efficiency might be improved if a contract governing the transaction could
be agreed upon in advance. Such a contract would give control of various
aspects of the exchange to the two parties involved. This paper studies
contracts of this nature. We examine the feasibility of implementing var-
ious agreements and the nature of optimal bilateral contracts.
One approach to this problem is to give control completely to oneparty
* orthe other. This is seen widely in practice as well as in theory.A
price per unit may be fixed and the buyer can name his quantity after seeing
the actual benefits that are relevant. A more complex versionpresents the
**
buyerwith a non—linear price schedule. Alternatively, the supplier may be
given control in a contract with a specified revenue function along which he
can optimize.
These solutions are fairly well understood. When the uncertainty is
entirely or primarily on one side of the market they can duplicate the fully
efficient solution ——thatis the quantity that would be traded in a full—
information world. When the random influences impact both parties signif i—
*
Weitzman(1974)
**
Spence(1977)—2—
cantly, full efficiency is not attainable. The choice of which side should
govern the contract is then dependent on the elasticity of benefits and costs,
and on the distribution of the random parameters.
The primary gal of this paper is to examine contracts that allow for
mutual control. While these contracts do not have the ability to achieve
the first—best, they may, in some cases, dominate one—sidedgovernance.
In the next section the basic model is set out. It is shom that
feasible contracts lead to traded quantities which, viewed as functions of
the random parameters, have to satisfy a certain partial differential equation.
Section 3 examines the special case in which the quantity traded has a
certain symmetric dependence on the parameters. This case allows us to re-
strict the partial differential equation in Section 2, obtaining a second—
order ordinary differential equation. Because this equation is non—linear
and because its right—hand side diverges at some points, its solutions
divide naturally into several different types. These are studied inSections4
and 5, and qualitative properties implied by them for the optimal contract
are presented in Section 6.
Numerical methods are used in Section 7 to construct various solutions
and verify the theoretical calculations.—3—
2. The Model
The basic structure of the model follows Weitzman (1974). There is
a buyer, whose willingness to pay for the good is
(1) U(q)+a q2 + cq
where q is the quantity traded. The other party to the contract is the seller,
whose reservation value for q is the negative of
() V(q)=bq—6q
Concavity requires that a and b be negative.
All of the uncertainty in the model enters through the coefficients of
the linear terms, c and 6. It is useful to note at the outset that the
efficient quantity is that which maximizes U + V,
(3) q*(E,6) =—
*
Toinsure that q is positive we suppose that E > 6with probability one.
In order to use the methods of incentive compatibility, it is convenient to
assume that (e,6) has a continuous bivariate distribution over a rectangle
2
in R
A contract is a pair of functions t,q which assign to each (c,5) the
monetary payment made by the buyer to the seller, t(c,6), and the quantity
received by the buyer from the seller q(c,6). Given any contract and given
the realized values of s and 6 the two players can be viewed as participants
in a game where the strategies are their professed values of Eand6, c,6
and their payoff functions are respectively—4—
(4) U(q(E,6)) -t(s,6)
and
(5) V(q(c,6)) + t(c,6)
Viewed in this way, contracts are direct Levelation mechanisms in the sense
of Green—Laffont (1979) or Laffont—Naskin (1980). Je willsay that a con-
tract is self—enforç or incentive compatible if the true value ofand the
true value of 6 are, respectively, dominant strategies in thisgame for the
buyer and seller respectively. If a contract were not self—enforcing, the
value to the two players would have to be computed at the equilibria of the
game. Multiple equilibria would typically arise. Little is known about
* thiscase. In this paper we examine self—enforcing contracts exclusively.
Moreover, as a technical matter it is convenient to assume that q(.,.) and
are twice continuously differentiable.
We now give a characterization of self—enforcing contracts. The optimal
strategies for players whose true parameters are Eand6 are determined by
the first—order conditions
(6) a q(c,6) q(E,6) + q(,6) —t(E,6)=0
(7) b q(c,6) q6(E,6) —5q6(c,6) +t6(E,6)0
where subscripts denote partial differentiation. Incentive compatibility
requires that these be identities in (E,6) when evaluated at=cand
o =0.
Differentiating (6 )withrespect to 6 and (7)withrespect to
we find (suppressing the arguments of all functions)
*Itmay indeed by the case that by using strategy spaces other than the
real line, we can implement discontinuous q(.,.) which nevertheless have a lower
welfare loss. This is beyond the scope of the present paper.—5—
(8) a q q6 + a qq + —t
=0
(9) b q q + b qq —5q+ t =0
Using =twe can eliminate from (8)obtaining
(10) ((a+b) q + (c—cS)) + (a+b) qq6 =0
Equation (10) is the fundamental partial differential equation of this
theory of bilateral contracts. In the risk neutral world we are considering,
efficiency and welfare losses can be determined entirely by the relationship
*
between q(c,5) and q (c,cS). Indeed the form of the benefit and cost functions
imply that the expected loss compared with full information is
1 *2
(11) (a+l2E (q—q )
Inany self—enforcing contract the quantity traded must satisfy (10). Optimal
contract design can thus be viewed as the problem of minimizing expected wel-
fare losses (11) subject to (10).
Note that function of only one of the two variables will satisfy (10). This
is another way of seeing that one—sided contract governance can be made quite
*
flexible by choosing the non—linear price or revenue functions appropriately.
The first—best given in (3), however, is unattainable through any self—enforcing
**
scheme.
*
Second—order conditions for the individuals must be respected as con-
straints. See below.
**
This result is well known, see Green—Laffont (1979).—6—
Before specializing and examining the nature of the solutionsto (10),
which will be the subject of the rest of thispaper, two further points
should be made. The individuals' second—order conditionsmust hold at each
value of the parameters, and this entails some furtherconstraints on the
functions q(.,.) that can be implemented. For thebuyer, we have that
(12) q(q)2 + a qq+ £q—t <0
To express this as a constraint on q, note that as (6) isan identity with
E= cwe can differentiate it with respect to c. Taking the result and sub-
tracting it from (12) yields
(13)q>0
Similarly, the seller's second—order condition when combined with the first—
order conditions for all 6 yields
(14) q6<0
Finally, the value of the problem for contracts with one—sidedgovernance
can be seen from the form of (11). With buyer's control,q should be set
* * atthe mean of q conditional on the value of c. This results ina welfare
loss of
(15) (a±b) var(61c)
*
If the conditional mean of 6 is positively related to c witha slope
exceeding unity, then the second—order conditions cannot be satisfied in
such a solution with buyer's control, and the welfare loss (15) isnot
actually attainable. We will not discuss this further, as the remainder of
the paper deals with two—sided controlcontracts, but we will be careful
to insure the second—order conditions throughout.—7—
when var (c5!E) is the conditional variance of 5 given E. And, for sellers'
control, the optimum is
(16) ab var (EI)3. Solutions That Depend on r-a
We haveshothat any seifenforcing contractentails that the quati—
tity traded satisfy (10). it Ic; thereforeof interest to examine the qual-
itative characteristics of suchsolutions in which p is genuinelydependent
upon both random shift parametersWe are not actually able to characterize
solutions in general. We focus attentionhere on those solutions that, like
the firstbest, depend onand 5 through their difference
(17) q(c,5)
Our focus on contracts of the fon; 17con Pc ustifiod by an axiom
which states that equal shifts in themarginal valuations of the buyer and the
seller do not alter the quantity t:raded.Formally this can be written as
(18) q(c+h, c±h) =q(c,i)
for all (r,5) and h in the domain,"
Under the specification (17) we know thatq =q5 H'q5—if
Thus, defining
*
Theassertion is proved as fellows. Difierentiate(i8 to obtain
q + qç =0
which we can differentiate again to obtain
—q
0
which is the so—called wave equation in(sees eg,, }iail:wig (1960), p.11), Its solutions are of the form
q(c,6) =
w1(e+6)+w2(o),
where w, c C are arbitrary. A directcomputation of q andq5 ano a substi- tution show that w '0so that the form (17) follows from axiom(18),—9—
x E
(19)
P(x) '(E—S) (a+b) (E—6) + (c5)
the basic partial differential equation (10)takes the form of the ordinary
differential equat4on.
(20) y'y + (1—q"2 =0
The function Y has a straightforward economic interpretation:
(21) =(a+b)(q—q)
*2 Therefore, since the optimal contract minimizes E(q—q ), wecan consider
the problem to be
2
(22) mm E
subject to 'solving(20).The second—order conditions (13) and (14) impose
the constraint
(23) Y' <1
which,as we will see below, allows us to restrict the class of solutions
to (20) corresponding to impleinentable contracts.
Equation (20)is an interesting sort of differential equation for several
reasons. It has one obvious family of solutions, namely
(24) P(x) =x+ c—10—
for any real number c. In economic terms these are the trivial solutions
for, using (19 ),onecan see that they correspond to q(c,S)
a±b
——a
completely inflexible and uncontingent contract.
There are other solutions to (20 ),andit is on these that we shall
focus. The difficulty in finding some of these solutionscan be traced to
the fact that it does not define a unique value of '1" when 'P =0.As is well—known
in the theory of differential equations, the existence anduniqueness of a
solution of an equation of order n given n initial conditions isguaranteed
in a neighborhood of the initial point only if the equation isLipschitzian
throughout such a neighborhood. The irregularity in this equation occurs
at a particularly unfortunate value, 'P0, which is precisely where q =q*.
Because of this fact, we will have to discuss solutions other than those
given by (24 )intwo separate cases: those where 'P has one—sign througout
the range of x, and those where 'Pis zero for some x. These will be called
onc—cincd and tuo—signed contracts respecitvcly, and are analyzed separately
in Sections 4 and 5.
We are looking for solutions to (20 )overthe domain of x that could
possibly arise. It is not necessary that the solution be extendableover the
*
whole real line.We will see that the solutions other than (24 )indeed
have the character that they cannot be extended beyonda bounded interval.
*
2 Indeed we have already assumed that (c,5) lies in arectangle in R—11--
Let us consider, at first informally, the qualitative nature of solutions
where 'Y has one sign. Suppose we are looking for a solution on [x0, x1] and
that we set V'(x0) <1,as required by the second—order conditions,
and 'Y(x0) >0.From (19)we can see that "(x0) must be negative. There-
fore Y' decreases further with x. At some x, =0and 'P is at a maximum;
beyond this 'P begins to decrease. In this region 'F" is diverging towards
—because('P'—1)2 is growing and 'P is going towards zero.
Solutions with 'P'(x0) <1,
'P(x0) >0for two different
values of
xO x
Such a solution exists only on intervals where the upper endpoint is below
the point where this degeneracy occurs.
The requirement that the solution exist throughout the range of x can
be viewed as placing constraints on 'P'(x0) and 'P(x0).If, for example, the
degeneracy were to occur before x1, then the value specified for 'Y(x0) could
be increased. It is easy to see that the resulting trajectory would be every-
where higher and would have a degeneracy at a larger value ofx1. In this
way the domain of the solution can be extended. It can also be extended by
raising 'P'(x0), which has a qualitatively similar effect.
'If =x——12—
4.One Signed—Solutions to (20)
In order to obtain manageable expressions for the solution, which will
eventually be obtained only by numerical methods, it is useful to convert
(20 )intoa first—order equation. This can be done because (20 )isautono-
mous ——xdoes not appear explicitly. Let
(25) z(1') =
sothat
dz dk dz (26)—
= = =• z
Thus (20 )canbe rewritten as the following first—order equation for z:
(27) z 'P + (l—z2 =0
This equation is separable in z and 'P and can be integrated toyield
(28) log'P = — log(l—z) + K
whereKis a constant of integration.
This can be rewritten using (25 )
—l
K 1—'P' (29) 'P =1k?
e
Thus (20 )hasbeen rewritten as a first—order equation, still autonomous,
but rather non—linear in 'P'. Such equationsmay be transformed* via differ-
entiation with respect to x
—l
—KW' 1w'
(30) 'P'
(1—'P')e 'k"
*
SeeAmes (1968), ch. 2.—13—
*
orusing the change of variable
—1
v(x)
(31)
U dv= dx
/1
wehave
(32) dx —Kv dv
Now (32 )canbe integrated on the left hand side fromx0, the lower endpoint
of the interval on which we want a solution, up tox, and from v(x0) to v(x)
on the right yielding
v (x)
(33) (x—x0) =—K (v—l) eV
v(x)
or
(34) x — =—K(v(x) —1)e" + K
(v(x0)
1)
To simplify this further, we can use the definition of K in terms of y and
Y',(31),together with the definition of v, (31 ),to write K in terms of
V(x) and v(x):
+1
(35) K =(x)(1'(x))e 1—
or
1 -v(x)
(36) K —'Y(x) e
Since (36 )isan identity in x we can use it twice in (34 ),evaluatedat x
and at x0:
*
This transformation involves dividing by F', and at q=O, this is ill—
defined, However, as '41'=O for only one value of x, this is not of consequence
when the integration is performed to yield (32), below,—14—
v(x )—l
(37) x -x
=(x)(V(X)-l)(X)v(x)
or, using the definition of v,
(38) x —
x0
=(x)('(x) -2)-(x0)(W'(x0) -2)
or, finally,
x -{x+ (x )(2 -'(x))}
(39) 'Y'(x)
0
w(x)
+ 2
Equation (39)is a first—order differential equation, linear in 'Y'
although non—linear in Y and x. Actually, itreally describes a family of
such equations because1"(x0) as well as P(x0) can be specified arbitrarily.
However, although (39) snecifiestheevolution of Y(.) at points x .7here
Y(x)0, its non—linear solutions cannot be extended beyonda bounded inter-
val. The extent of this domain of Y(•) is determinedby the choice of
and i"(x0). Consider (34). Since K >0and v(x) <0the first term on the
right—hand side is positive. Moreover since for positivelysigned solutions
v(x) converges to zero (from below) as x increases, the firstterm is de-
creasing in x. Thus
v(x0) (40) x —
x0
=K(l+(v(x0)
—1)e )
servesto define the domain of x. Using (36) (atx0) to eliminate K we have
from (40) that
1
l—'Y'(x)
(41) (x —
x0)'Y(x0)('(x0)
—2+ (1 —"(x0))e )
Theimplication of this restriction on the domain of ''()forthe design
of contracts is as follows: Givenany joint distribution of (E,S),wemustI 5--
choose 'Y(x0) and so that x = —5satisfies (41) with probability one.
This constrains the expression in brackets in (39) and leads to pointwise higher
solutions the larger the required domain.—16—
5. Two—Signed Solutions to (19)
In this section it is demonstrated that the entirefamily of two—signed
solutions to (19) obeying Y'1 can be generated as follows.
Compute a positive one—signed solution on an interval
[x1, x2J. Extend
the solution "backwards" belowx1, as far as possible ——thatis until '1' -0.
Call the limit of x for which the right—hand side of(19) is well defined,
x0.
Next, compute a negative one—signed solution over some interval
[x3, x3] and
continue the solution beyondx4 until Y -0.Let the value of x for which
this limit is reached bex5. Since (19) is autonomous, one can "shift" this
negative solution byx0 —x5,obtaining a solution over {x3 +
x0
—
x5,x0).
Finally, set (x0) =0.Composing the positive and negative one—signed
solutions with this point we have a function definedover [x3 — — x5,x2].
We will now show that this function indeed solves(19), in particular
at x0, and that all two—signed solutions to (19)are of this form.
To show that such a procedure results ina solution to (19) it is only
necessary to show that V't(x0) exists. By construction (19) will then besatis-
fied as both terms are zero.
As a preliminary result we will establish that Y'(x)-÷1as x -
x0•
Reconsider (28)
(28) log 'I' = — log(l—v') + K
The trajectories of solutions in the ('i',i")plane are thus parameterized by
K. We want to show that all trajectories satisfy 'Y' ÷1as 'I' --0,that is,
that they all emanate from the point W =0,XII' =1and not from any point
where =0,IJ'<1.4'
—17—
That is that for all Kweget a trajectory like A and never like B.
If we had one like B, then take '1" >'Y'and 'F' < 1. For any fixed K
and 'F sufficiently small, the left—hand side of (27) can be adjusted so
that it holds. Thus ailtrajectories cut every vertical line ('F' <1)in
this plane, and hence B is not a possible trajectory.
(42)
Now to show that 'Y"(x0) exists (and is equal to zero).
At any point in a neighborhood of x0 we have
= —(1—
'F(x)
Using (29) this becomes
(43)
—l
-(1—'F'(x))3 l-'F'(x) —— e K
From the previous discussion we know that 'Y'(x) --1along any trajectory.
Therefore
(44) urn W"(x)=0
x÷xO
To show that 'Y"(x0) exists we apply the mean—value theorem. (Rudin (1964), p. 93
th. 5.10) to the function 'F'(•).Weknow that 'F' is continuous on
A
B—18—
[x0,x0 +ruand differentiable on (x0,
x0+)for any >0.Thus there
exists 0 <h()<nsuchthat
'i"(x +) —''(x)
(45)
0 0=
Takinglimits as r -0we find
(46) 1"(x0) =urnY"(h()) =urn'"(x) 0.
fl0
Precisely analagous arguments apply to the left of x0 establishing
that'F"(x0) is well defined in this pieced—together function.—19—
6. Characteristics of the Payment Function
In the preceding sections we have analyzed the nature of possible
solutions to the fundamental equation (19) derived from (10). These results
are important in that they permit a qualitative characterization of the cost
function C(q,5) of the buyer and the revenue function R(q,c) of the seller
with respect to the traded quantity q.
Given a contract t =t(c,5),q =q(c,cS)we can, by utilizing the implicit
function theorem,solve the latter to obtain c =c(q,5),because q > 0 by the
second order conditions. Substituting this to the former we obtain the cost
function of the buyer C(q,5) =t(c(q,5),5J.By differentiating once
aC(q,)=t/q
and twice
(47) 2C(q,)=tEE
2+
3q ()
Toevaluate (47) we have t from (6), tobtained by differentiating (6), and
compute
2 q
(48) 1 - cc
q2
—qq(c(q,5),6)
—
(q)3
In total we have the result
(49) 2C(q, S)— 1
2 a+
the sign of which is in general uncertain. For the special case of solutions
dependent on (c—5) it is possible to rewrite (49) in terms of the function q'
which was analyzed in the preceding sections. The conclusion is that t[q,5]—20—
is convex (concave resp.) in q whenever 'F' >(<resp.) —
Asimilar computation for the seller's revenue function yields the
result
2
(50) R(q,E) =—b+
whichin turn implies that t[q;E] is convex (concave resp.) in q whenever
'F' <(>resp.) —
Theseresults can be interpreted easily by noting that, for example, the
convexity of C(q,5) in q means that the unit price for the buyer is rising,
i.e., quantity premia appear. In the same vein, whenever C(q,) is concave
in q the contract stipulates quantity discounts, i.e., the unit price for the
buyer is decreasing.
This analysis can be conveniently related to the different types of
solution 'F of the basic differential equation (19). Consider first a positively
signed solution discussed in Section 4 above. For then 'F' is first positive,
but as x (=E 5)increases it turns more and more negative which implies
that R(q,c) is first convex but it eventually becomes concave. Therefore in
these contracts the buyer faces quantity premia at low levels of the traded
quantity but discounts appear at high volumes of trading. In Section 7
numerical computations illustrate this phenomenon.
For negatively—signed contracts the conclusion is reversed, i.e.,
quantity discounts appear at low levels of trading.
As shown in Section 5, two—signed contracts are pieced from one—signed
contracts on subintervals so that with them quantity discounts are present at
both sufficiently low and high levels of trading while in the intermediaterange quantity premia are the rule.
diagram.
tJ
—21—
These features are illustrated in the
Lnt premia
discounts
x
I
L
Figure 1—22—
7. Numerical Computations
By virtue of the results in the last three sections a numerical compu-
tation of the solutions to (19) can be derived from the one—signed solutions
over fixed intervals (x0, Xmax) with the properties that
limI'lim' =0
X--X X-X
0 max
In this section we examine some qualitative properties of these solutions.
Finding second—best bilateral contracts, that is those which minimize
E'Y2, is generally a complex problem. Alternative solutions to (19) cannot
be ranked by pointwise dominance. The optimal solution in principal depends
heavily on the distribution of x =— 5.
Despite this theoretical possibility, our computations show that it is
relatively easy to find a solution to (19) that is "almost" the pointwise
minimizer of y throughout "almost" all of the domain of definition. There-
fore, except in extreme cases where the distribution of x is concentrated
close to the endpoints of [x0, XmaxJ this particular solution will serve
as a good approximation to the optimum.
We now describe the numerical method used and present an illustrative
calculation.
Let the length of the interval over which we seek a solution be fixed
at L =x —x.From(40) we have an implicit relationship between V(x ) max 0 0
and that must be satisfied if the solution is to be well—defined over
this interval:
1
l—I"(x )
(51) (x0) =L/'(x0)
-2+ (1 —'(x0))
e—23—
Thus for fixed L we consider the one parameter family of solutions to
(39) where '(x0) is fixed arbitrarily in (0,1) and 1'(x0) is given by the
solution to (51) with equality. A standard computer program for numerical
integration was used to integrate the expression for '+"(x) fromx0 to x.
Figure 2 displays the results for various choices of tY'(x0) when L =10.
The central feature of this simulation is that the solution obtained for
=.9is "almost" the pointwise minimizer of the family of all solutions
obtained for values of '"(x0) in steps of .02. Only for x —
x0
.2 or
x —
x0
=9.8were any of the other solutions below this one.
This result seems robust to the length of the interval and to step
sizes of i''(x0) used to construct the families of solutions. It is probably
a good approximation to the optimal one—signed solution over this interval
for most distributions of x.
Wethencomputed the non—linear price and revenue functions that are
implicit in the optimal contract, using this result as an approximation for the
optimum. This computation was compatible with the results of Section 6 on
the concavity properties of these functions.
The numerical '(•)obtainedabove was substituted into the expressions
=(a'i'+ a5 + bc)(c0 +Y —(E—cS))
(a+b)
(52)
(bW—bE—a5)(c+Y —
t5(c,6)
= 20
a+b)
where c0 =x0
—
'Y(x0)(2
—
'P'(x0)).Both a and b were set at —1. These partial
derivatives were integrated numerically over the rectangle (c,)E([5,l0} X [0,5])
so that, as required, c—cSc [0,10].The value of t(5,0) =0was taken as a—24—
normalizationwithout loss of generality.
From this function t(,c5) we computed the price and revenue functions
5—610—6 asfollows. For each value of 6andeach qE(——, 2we find the value of
so that ((c—6) — = q.This gives us a function E(q,6) whose inter-
pretation is that it is the tannouncementtI of E which, when combined with the
givenvalue of 6, would induce the given value of q to be exchanged under the
contract F. Finally, the total cost to the buyer of quantity C(q,6), is
defined by C(q,3) =t(c(q,6),6).The revenue functions of the seller facing
a buyer whose announced parameter is s, R(q,c), is given symmetrically.
Some of these cost and revenue functions are given in Figures 3 and 4.
It is noteworthy that the quantity discount/quantity premia results of Section
6 are verified in this numerical construction.
Because we cannot find the true optimum without knowing the distribution
of x, and, more importantly, because we cannot find general incentive compatible
contracts other than those in the special case q(c,6) =(c—6),these nunerical
results should be viewed as merely illustrative.-25-
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